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Abstract 
This paper proposes and demonstrates that experimental and quasi-experimental 
program evaluation methods can be applied to some parts of the defense acquisition system 
to provide evidence of program effectiveness.  The specific example presented is a quasi-
experimental evaluation of the Department of Defense Small Business Innovation Research 
program.  Quasi-experimental methods are a set of program evaluation techniques that 
allow researchers to approximate the results of an experimental study, such as a 
randomized controlled trial, without performing the experiment.  The paper performs a quasi-
experimental evaluation of the DoD SBIR program, which provides evidence that the 
program is effective at transitioning SBIR-funded technologies into other DoD programs.  
This demonstration that quasi-experimental methods can be used to evaluate certain 
aspects of the DoD acquisition system provides policy analysts with new tools to meet 
Congressional requirements for acquisition system evaluation.  The paper recommends that 
more quasi-experimental studies be conducted and actual experimental studies be 
executed.  These methods can help the DoD overcome the well-documented deficiency in 
evaluating the effectiveness of its acquisition systems.  The Office of Management and 
Budget, the Government Accountability Office and the House Armed Services Committee 
unanimously agree that the DoD does not objectively measure the performance of its 
acquisition system.   
Motivational Quotes 
Findings.-The Congress finds that-  
(1) waste and inefficiency in Federal programs undermine the confidence of the 
American people in the Government and reduces the Federal Government's ability to 





(2) Federal managers are seriously disadvantaged in their efforts to improve program 
efficiency and effectiveness because of insufficient articulation of program goals and 
inadequate information on program performance; and  
(3) Congressional policymaking, spending decisions, and program oversight are 
seriously handicapped by insufficient attention to program performance and results. 
-- Introduction to the Government Performance Results Act of 1993 
(Sec. 5403) Directs each federal agency required to participate in the SBIR or STTR 
program to: 
(1) develop metrics evaluating the effectiveness and benefit of the program which 
are scientifically based, reflect the agency's mission, and include factors relating to 
the economic impact of the programs;  
(2) conduct an annual evaluation of their SBIR and STTR programs using such 
metrics; and 
(3) report each evaluation's results to the Administrator and the small business 
committees. 
- Public Law 111-84, signed by President Obama on October 28, 2009, (authorizes 
National Defense for FY2010, and specifically authorizes the DoD SBIR/STTR 
Programs through September 30, 2010)  
The Panel began with the question of how well the defense acquisition system is 
doing in delivering value to the warfighter and the taxpayer. For the most part, the 
Panel found that there is currently no objective way to answer this question. For most 
categories of acquisition, only anecdotal information exists about instances where 
the system either performed well, or poorly. Even where real performance metrics 
currently exist, they do not fully address the question. The Panel strongly believes 
that the defense acquisition system should have a performance management 
structure in place that allows the Department’s senior leaders to identify and correct 
problems in the system, and reinforce and reward success. 
- House Armed Services Committee Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform Findings 
and Recommendations, March 23, 2010  
Introduction 
Evaluating the effectiveness of any government program is difficult. Data on the 
program’s output is often hard to obtain, selection into the program is usually not random 
and few programs are structured to facilitate the application of causal effects analysis. The 
Department of Defense (DoD) Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program is one 
such government program.  Evaluating the effectiveness of the DoD SBIR program is 
required by Congress, who directs each federal agency to “develop metrics evaluating the 
effectiveness and benefit of the program which are scientifically based, reflect the agency's 
mission, and include factors relating to the economic impact of the programs.”  Despite this 
legal requirement and nearly 30 years of running the SBIR program, neither DoD 
administrators, nor policy analysts evaluating the program know whether the program is 
actually effective in supporting the DoD R&D mission by transitioning SBIR-funded 
technologies into DoD weapons systems.  In their most recent assessments, the 
Government Accountability Office and the Office of Management and Budget, found that the 
effectiveness of the DoD SBIR program has not been demonstrated (GAO, 2005; OMB, 





The indeterminate effectiveness of the relatively small SBIR program is just one case 
of the DoD generally not examining its acquisition processes.  Congress finds that the 
Department of Defense acquisition system does routinely use objective methods to measure 
and improve its functions.  Specifically, on March 23, 2010, the House Armed Services 
Committee on Defense Acquisition Reform concluded that there is no objective way to 
determine “how well the defense acquisition system is doing in delivering value to the 
warfighter.” (HASC, 2010)  Congress has officially required evidence-based policy 
administration by all Federal Agencies since 1993 through the Government Performance 
and Results Act (GPRA).  The GAO finds fault with the DoDs implementation of the GPRA, 
finding serious flaws in the DoD’s Program Management business processes, which are 
responsible for managing DoD acquisition.  Specifically the GAO cites, that the DoD’s plan 
to improve program management “lacked basic information, such as identifying specific 
business areas and key elements, such as goals, objectives, and performance measures.” 
(GAO, 2010)  There is ample evidence that DoD’s measurement of its acquisition processes 
needs improvement.  Unfortunately for many of the complex and unique acquisition 
processes that the DoD manages, instituting suitable performance measures has proved 
difficult.  This paper shows that performance measurement tools exist for one small piece of 
the defense acquisition portfolio—the DoD SBIR program.   
This paper proposes a methodology for measuring the performance of the DoD SBIR 
program that adapts quasi-experimental methods from the broader program evaluation 
literature.  The paper begins with a description of the DoD SBIR program.   It then describes 
the basics of the DoD SBIR program and examines two key biases in past DoD SBIR 
program evaluations that have confounded researchers: response bias and selection bias.  
The paper then documents strategies to mitigate these biases using quasi-experimental 
methods that have been used in other program evaluations.  Next, the paper illustrates that 
a better evaluation of the DoD SBIR program is possible if better methods are applied to 
existing data.  The paper then offers suggestions for strengthening evaluation of the SBIR 
program with better data collection methods and with randomization.  With evidence that 
better evaluations of defense acquisition processes are possible, the paper concludes with 
suggestions for further evidence-based research. 
Description of the DoD SBIR Program and Biases in Past 
Evaluations 
Congress requires that all federal agencies with extramural R&D budgets in excess 
of $100M, including the Department of Defense, set aside 2.5% of their R&D budget for the 
SBIR program.  The broad purpose of the program is to provide contracts to qualifying small 
businesses to support each agency’s research mission, and to commercialize the funded 
technologies. In 2010, the SBIR program represents about 1% of the $108B that the 
Department of Defense spends on procurement.   Congress sets the emphasis of the 
program with the following four goals: 1) to stimulate technological innovation; 2) to use 
small businesses to meet federal R&D needs; 3) to foster participation by disadvantaged 
businesses; and 4) to increase private sector commercialization of federally funded research 
(OSADBU, 2007).  Congress places more emphasis on the goal of increasing private sector 
commercialization. 
The law also requires the participating federal agencies to structure their SBIR 
programs with three-phases, with specific funding ceilings for each phase.  Phase I funds up 
to $100K for a 6-month feasibility study competitively awarded to firms.  Phase II is the 





Phase I submissions.  Phase III is the commercialization phase, which is the period when 
firms sell their mature technologies to interested parties—often DoD prime contractors or 
program offices.  No pre-allocated SBIR program funds support Phase III commercialization; 
however, if a topic reaches Phase III, the firm can be awarded a contract for that technology 
immediately, without competition.   The design of the SBIR Phases is intended to transition 
the most promising technologies from the thousands of ideas of the participating small 
contractors into fielded technologies.   
Within the constraints of the program, Congress offers freedom for the agencies to 
manage the SBIR program to fit the R&D strategies of the participating agencies, which are 
important to understand in order to evaluate the program.  Each agency has many 
noteworthy organizational innovations for managing a large dollar R&D program without 
explicit overhead that is required to award contracts and grants in relatively small dollar 
amounts.  The 2008 DoD annual report to Congress on the SBIR program highlights some 
of these challenges.  In 2008 the DoD solicited proposals for nearly 1,000 topics, for which 
they processed over 12,000 proposals, ultimately awarding about two SBIR contracts per 
topic.  In order to manage this administrative workload, the DoD manages the process 
online—publishing two or three SBIR solicitations a year online, requiring proposers to 
register with the DoD SBIR program with their unique federal contractor identification 
number and to submit their proposals online.  These online contract management tools will 
be shown later to be invaluable for measuring the program effectiveness. 
As highlighted in this paper’s introductory quote from the 2009 re-authorization of the 
SBIR program, Congress requires the program administrators to develop metrics on the 
program’s effectiveness.  The DoD has created a metric called the Commercialization 
Achievement Index.  This index is not deemed sufficient to measure the program’s 
effectiveness (OMB, 2005).  More broadly than the specific DoD program, across all federal 
SBIR programs, since its inception the effectiveness of the program to increase 
commercialization has never been evaluated (GAO, 2005).  Among the specific reasons the 
GAO cites are lack of an agreed-upon measure of effectiveness for commercialization and 
lack of reliable data on the program.  Published evaluations of the SBIR program typically 
suffer from two common issues identified in the broader literature on program evaluation:  
selection bias and response bias. 
The key aspects of past DoD SBIR program evaluations that are presumed to cause 
bias are the fact that evaluations must be performed after the fact of selection and with self-
reported survey data.  Response bias affects program evaluations that rely on surveys 
because it is presumed that program participants over-report the output resulting from the 
program.  Participants have an incentive to attribute more benefit from program participation 
in a survey so that the program will continue to receive funding and the participants continue 
to receive the benefits of the program.  Selection bias is the presumption that program 
administrators are not selecting program participants at random. Specifically, selection bias 
invalidated after-the-fact evaluations because it is assumed that more capable participants 
are selected at a higher rate and that these firms, in the absence of the program, are more 
productive.  In the case of the DoD SBIR program analyzed in this paper, winning firms were 
bigger, older, and more experienced defense contractors and as a result had more non-
SBIR defense contracts before and after winning a SBIR award. 
An ideal experiment of the SBIR program would randomly assign SBIR program 
treatment on a population of firms qualifying for the SBIR program and see if the treated 





been conducted, which motivates the example in this paper, estimating the treatment effect 
for winning a DoD SBIR award with after-the-fact evaluation methods and non-survey data.   
Strategies to Mitigate Biases 
To perform a better effectiveness evaluation on the DoD SBIR program this paper 
builds a data set based on 2003 SBIR applications.  To control for response bias, the 
applications were matched to the defense contract database rather than to survey data.  
The analysis uses after-the-fact quasi-experimental models to control for selection bias, 
which have been shown to approximate the results of a randomized controlled trial under 
certain assumptions.  
The program evaluation literature documents that the least biased program 
evaluations rely on a neutral source of outcome data (i.e. not reported by administrators or 
participants), have pre-treatment and post treatment observations, contain many 
characteristics of the participants and collect data on the treated population and a 
representative control population.  The data set created for this analysis uses defense 
contract award data as the outcome of interest.  The contract award data are an output of 
the defense accounting process represented by the DD Form 350, which documents and 
publishes every contract award greater that $25K.  The DoD identifies each contract 
awardee with a unique contractor identification number, which can be linked electronically to 
other databases the DoD maintains.  This paper links to the DoD’s Central Contractor 
Registry (CCR) and the DoD SBIR program’s database of SBIR applications to capture firm 
characteristics in the database.  The characteristics of each firm are important to after-the-
fact program evaluations, because researchers can explain some of the variation in program 
effectiveness by correlating program outcomes with firm characteristics.  For example, larger 
firms might win more defense contracts dollars simply because they have the capacity to 
take on more DoD-funded work, regardless of whether they won a SBIR award.   The DoD 
SBIR program’s database of SBIR applications captured information on all firms that applied 
for the DoD SBIR program by year of application and identified the firm’s proposal that won 
an award.  These pieces of information enabled the identification of a treatment population 
which applied for and won a SBIR award in a given year and a control population of firms 
that applied for but did not win an award.   Creating a comparable control group with 
distinguishing characteristics is the crucial ingredient identified by program evaluation 
literature to controlling selection bias.   
To control for selection bias the current program evaluation literature suggests using 
doubly robust estimation (DRE) methods to estimate the relationship between winning a 
SBIR award and future defense contract dollars.  As the name implies, researchers use two 
methods to estimate a treatment effect.  The first method prescribed is propensity score 
matching (PSM), which uses the observable covariates of the firms to create balanced 
treatment and control population.  The second method prescribed is to perform a statistical 
estimation of the treatment effect that uses the characteristics of the firms to explain 
variation in future defense contracts (usually a regression with controls model).  By 
combining two different estimation strategies, researchers have two chances to build the 
correct model.  According to DRE theory, this approach will estimate a consistent treatment 
effect even if only one of the models is correct.  The characteristic of double robustness is 
achieved in after-the-fact program evaluations when the estimation from the PSM model and 
the statistical model are consistent in magnitude and significance.  Under ideal conditions 
and with enough descriptive data, by applying these methods, a better estimate of the 





A Naïve Estimate of SBIR Treatment 
In order to show why using a balanced treatment and control population is better 
than using raw data, this paper begins with a naïve estimate of the DoD SBIR program’s 
treatment effect.  Researchers with a treatment and control group typically estimate a 
treatment effect with a differences in differences estimate.  The first difference is calculated 
by subtracting the outcome observed before treatment and after treatment for each group.  
The second difference is equal to the difference in treatment between treated and non-
treated observations.    
A differences in differences is not the same as a typical program evaluation report 
based on a survey.  A survey based estimate can only report the average raw output data 
on the treated group.  For example, the National Academies of Sciences reports the 
average raw survey response to estimate sales generated by SBIR funded research to be 
$1.3M per SBIR project (Wessner, 2007).    This average survey response is not a 
differences in differences because it does not compare the results to non-treated 
observations.  Because the dataset created for this paper identifies winners and losers, it 
can be used to estimate a naïve differences in differences.  Naïve means that that selection 
bias is not controlled. 
The dataset used for this estimation is based on the entire population of DoD SBIR 
applicants in 2003 obtained from the Department of Defense SBIR administrative website.  
From the population of 2003 applications, a subset of 1460 firms who also applied in 2004, 
and who had a contractor identification number in the Central Contractor Registry, was 
identified as the population of interest.  The DoD SBIR administrative database identifies 
687 of these firms as winning a 2003 SBIR contract, with 773 applying for, but not winning, 
in 2003.  These 1460 firms were matched with their contractor identification numbers to the 
form DD350 database maintained by the Department of Defense Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports.  The DD350 contains all contract actions greater than $25K 
organized by year and by individual contractor identification number.    
Using the SBIR application dataset, the first difference between average total non-
SBIR defense contract dollars won in 2004 minus the 2003 total ∆04-03  is $650K for the 
average winner and $203K for the average loser (see Table 3).  The second difference, the 
average treatment difference between winners and losers, is $447K.  This naive treatment 
effect is assumed to be affected by selection bias. 
Table 1. Naive Differences in Differences 
Group/Year 2003 2004 ∆04-03
Winners 1,430 2,081 650
Losers 456 659 203
∆W-L 974 1,422 $447K
The effect of selection bias is presumably the cause of the SBIR winners having on 
average of $974K more in contracts than losers did in 2003, and $1.4M more in contracts in 
2004.  Because winners have more contracts to start out with, and firms with more past 
contracts will probably win more future contracts before and after winning in 2003, it is 
impossible to isolate the effect of winning the SBIR award in 2003.  To improve on this naïve 





Evidence of a SBIR Treatment Effect 
The naïve treatment effect estimate can be improved by using the characteristics of 
firms to explain some of their variation in treatment.  The characteristics are used two ways 
to control variation.  The first method to control variation using firm characteristics is to use 
an algorithm to balance the characteristics of the treatment and control populations.  The 
balancing algorithm will discard outlying observations so that the treatment and control 
populations will be theoretically identical to a randomized controlled trial population.  The 
second method to produce a better estimate of treatment effect using firm characteristics is 
to use the firm characteristics to explain variation in the outcome.  For example by using a 
pre-treatment observation of defense contracts before a firms wins a SBIR contract, some of 
the variation in the post-treatment contract award amounts can be explained. 
Applying these two methods to the dataset build for this paper can better estimate a 
treatment effect for the DoD SBIR program.   This research method is described by Ho, 
Imai, King, and Stuart (2007) as doubly robust estimation.  Double robust estimation 
protocols prescribe balancing populations and then using statistical methods to estimate the 
treatment effect.  Analysis in Ho, Imai, King and Stuart (2007) shows consistency between 
the results of RCT studies analyzed with DRE methods.  Their analysis supports the 
conclusion that estimates of causal treatment effects can be produced by DRE methods if 
researchers properly balance the treatment and control groups or researcher apply the 
correct statistical model.  Their analysis based on thousands of different population 
balancing assumptions and statistical models with data from randomized controlled trials 
supports the conclusion that if the average treatment effect estimated with balanced 
treatment and control groups is consistent with the estimated treatment effect from another 
statistical model (such as a regression model) then the DRE estimate can be considered a 
causal estimate.   
The model demonstrated estimates the future average increase in non-SBIR defense 
contracts for firms winning a 2003 DoD SBIR award.  The key parameter of interest is the 
correlation between winning a 2003 SBIR award and non-SBIR defense contracts in 2004.  
The control variables are total non-SBIR contracts in 2002, total SBIR contracts in 2002, the 
firms’ first contract year, the number of employees in 2003, whether the firm won a defense 
contract as a sub contractor in 2003, the number of topics submitted in 2003, and the total 
number of past Phase I or II awards. 
The populations are balanced using the Coarsened Exact Matching protocols 
described by Iacus, King,  and Porro (2008).  The balanced population retains 534 firms that 
won in 2003 and 681 losing firms for a 83% post-matching retention rate. As an example of 
the improvement in post-matching balance, the raw population had a difference in 2002 non-
SBIR contracts of $925K, the matched population, $58K. 
The doubly robust estimation model estimates a $147K treatment effect, with 
confidence level of greater than 99%.  Based on this estimate, there is empirical support that 
the SBIR program increases defense contracts in 2004 for firms winning SBIR contracts in 
2003.  
The estimation that the DoD SBIR program does significantly increase non-SBIR 
defense contracts one year after award might be missing delayed effects two or three years 
after award. A three year commercialization time horizon is supported by surveys on the 
self-reported commercialization outcomes related to the SBIR program by the National 
Academies of Science  (Wessner, 2007) and contract award analysis by RAND (Held, 





after a SBIR award.  A doubly robust estimation is used to estimate several treatment effects 
for the non-SBIR DoD contracts won by firms in 2005 and 2006 who also won a 2003 DoD 
SBIR award.  The doubly robust estimated treatment effect for the 2005 non-SBIR contract 
dollar difference is $106K; the 2006 difference is $130K. Both estimates are statistically 
significant at the greater than 99% confidence level.  These estimations of a lagged 
treatment effect support a conclusion that for the average firm, winning a DoD SBIR award 
puts a company on a sustained path towards winning more future DoD contract dollars than 
had they not won.  
Winning a DoD SBIR award appears to put winning firms on a path of higher non-
SBIR defense contract award dollars.  Figure 1 illustrates that for the period between 2004 
and 2006 firms that applied for and won a 2003 SBIR contract won an average of $370K 
more defense contracts than a matching set of firms who applied for but did not win a 2003 
DoD SBIR award.  The DoD SBIR program appears to be effective at increasing 

















Three-year Estimated Treatment Effect of Winning a 2003 SBIR Award 
The Department of Defense explicitly acknowledges that access to new technology 
and a strong industrial base are crucial to United States national security  (OSD, 2010).   
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the DoD SBIR program may be both 
providing access to new technologies and broadening the industrial base by transitioning 
new technologies developed by small businesses into defense programs through defense 
contracts. The evidence that firms winning SBIR contracts increase their future sales to the 
DoD at a higher rate than had they not won supports the belief that the DoD SBIR program 
contributes to the DoD mission.  Prior to this analysis, the DoD emphasized without proof 
that they used the DoD SBIR program to support mission oriented research needs rather 
than to increase private sector commercialization.  With proof that the commercialization 





DoD can fulfill their GPRA requirement to demonstrate the effectiveness of their 
administration of the program and support the DoD preference against private sector 
commercialization.   
This evidence can also provide a positive feedback loop for potential small business 
participants and program offices on the fence as to whether the program is worth their 
efforts.  Higher quality potential contractors might be motivated to apply.  Defense 
acquisition managers might be motivated to put more effort into developing SBIR topics and 
managing the technology transition process.   
How to Improve DoD SBIR Program Evaluation 
 This analysis is motivated by a literature review of the SBIR program, which 
contains numerous government reports, policies and regulations requiring better evaluations 
of the DoD SBIR program.  Most of the policy responses to the need for better evaluation, 
such as the DoD-developed Commercialization Achievement Index, and the surveys 
conducted by the GAO and National Academies of Science, fall short of actually providing 
data for better evaluation because the data collected is incomplete, presumably subject to 
response bias and does not collect data on treated and untreated populations. By using the 
already-existing defense contract database, this paper shows that there exists a data source 
free from self-reported survey response bias to evaluate the program.  Additionally, by using 
econometric methods to control for selection bias, this paper provides policy makers with 
one example that it is possible to evaluate one key aspect of the program.  The policy 
recommendations on how to improve evaluation will increase the number of studies on the 
program, allow researchers to explore more evidence of SBIR research output, and improve 
the policy recommendations of the program evaluations.  This paper motivates three 
possible policy implementations the DoD can use to improve the evaluation of the DoD 
SBIR program.  The first is to make the DoD SBIR administrative data accessible to more 
researchers.  The second would be to build automated links to the applying SBIR firms to 
other innovation proxies—most specifically, the US Patent database, the iEdison database, 
and technical publication databases.  Finally, to more conclusively evaluate the DoD SBIR 
program, some form of Randomized Control Trials will need to be implemented, and the 
enormous number of topics and applicants makes the DoD SBIR a good candidate to 
implement RCT’s to evaluate the program.   
Evaluation Recommendation 1: Make SBIR Administrative Data Available to 
Researchers 
 The first recommendation to improve evaluation of the program, making 
administrative data more accessible to researchers, is a low cost, easily implementable 
policy change with potential for significant payback.  As already documented in the review of 
SBIR evaluations, one of the consistent themes of all past SBIR program evaluations is the 
lack of reliable, consistent data and the resulting lack of conclusive studies about the 
program’s effectiveness.  Additionally, the broader literature on R&D evaluations in general 
suffers from the same problems: lack of reliable data and a resultant dearth of conclusive 
evaluations on R&D programs.  Opening the wealth of already-existing data collected by the 
DoD SBIR program to policy analysts would be an enormous step towards improving 
collective knowledge about how effective R&D subsidy programs really are.  One specific 
example of data that is available to program administrators but not to program evaluators is 
the proposal evaluation scores used to award SBIR contracts.  If these scores were made 





propensity score models or to control for variation in outcome.  Importantly, since the DoD 
SBIR program is probably already collecting this information for administrative purposes in 
electronic formats and making the data to available to administrators via the internet, the 
cost to make the data accessible to R&D policy researchers would be minimal.  The 
payback for making this data available to research policy analysts that have spent decades 
trying to determine the efficacy of R&D policies with nearly zero reliable data is potentially 
significant  Policy makers could have more fact-based studies to improve policy to meet the 
spirit and intent of the Government Performance and Results Act.   
Evaluation Recommendation 2: Link SBIR Funding to More Innovation Proxy 
Data Sources 
The second policy recommendation to improve the evaluation of the DoD SBIR 
program is to enable automated matching of SBIR administrative data to other sources of 
innovation output data such as patent data, innovation tracking databases, sales data, 
venture capital funding, or technical publication data.  Per US law, any SBIR participant is 
mandated to report to the government the details of any inventions or patents generated 
from the program.  Unfortunately, the reporting is often decentralized, and the data collected 
is not easily linked to the actual source of funding.  There are certainly more research 
outputs than just increased DoD sales tracked through the defense contracting database 
that could be used to measure the impact of the DoD SBIR program.  Examples of 
potentially useful data sources are the US Patent and Trademark Database, technical paper 
databases, databases of firms such as COMPUSTAT, HOOVERS or DUNS, venture capital 
tracking databases, initial public offering databases, merger databases, or Internal Revenue 
Service data.  Currently automated linking of SBIR participant data to another data source is 
not possible because not all of the databases can be linked using contractor identification 
numbers or DUNS numbers.  The lack of a common standard firm identifier leaves 
researchers with the option of trying to match research inputs to output based on firm 
names, which contain tremendous variation in spelling within and across databases.  The 
SBIR program could require firms to include their DUNS number in the already-required 
government interest statements for patents generated by SBIR funds.  For matching 
technical publications, the SBIR program could require firms to report SBIR-generated 
technical publications with full citations in future application packages.  Since SBIR 
application packages are submitted electronically, the government can begin to understand 
the impact of the SBIR program on the body of technical knowledge through patent 
disclosure analysis and technical publication analysis.  
The most expedient link to establish might be the link between SBIR funding and the 
interagency Edison (iEdison) database maintained by the National Institutes of Health.  This 
database was created to fulfill the statutory requirement for federally funded researchers to 
report inventions and patents developed with Federal funds.  Currently it collects data from 
some, but not all, DoD research organizations.  DoD SBIR policies could be modified to 
require winning firms to report inventions and patents through this database, and to require 
the inclusion of the funding contract number and the correct contractor identification number.   
A final suggestion to improve tracking of SBIR output activity would be to require 
proposing firms to submit their tax identifier number to conclusively link SBIR funding to 
actual growth in revenue.  Since all firms winning SBIR awards must be US companies, this 
policy intervention would cover the entire population of awardees.  Moreover, since the IRS 





auditing, the validity of the sales and revenue data will be substantially more accurate than 
the data self-reported in surveys.  Another strength of this source of data would be that the 
study population could be expanded beyond the non-representative sample of survey 
respondents to include potentially all SBIR applicants. 
The strengthening of the links between DoD SBIR program data sources and data 
sources on innovation proxies will greatly improve the quality and quantity of analyses 
possible on the program.  If any of these policy recommendations improve evaluating the 
link between innovation subsidies to innovation output, a new era of R&D policy evaluation 
can begin and better R&D policies can be created. 
Evaluation Recommendation 3: Implement Limited Randomized Control Trials 
for Improved Evaluations 
The final suggestion for improving evaluation of the SBIR program is to continue to 
apply and refine research methods proven to mitigate biases, including using randomized 
controlled trails.  The Government Performance and Results Act requires all agencies to 
strive towards evidence based policy implementation.  The gold standard research method 
to provide conclusive evidence of program effectiveness would be to conduct a randomized 
control trial by randomizing some aspects of the contract awards.  Of all the R&D subsidy 
and small business programs and the program evaluations reviewed for this paper, the 
SBIR program might be the most conducive to incorporating randomization to improve 
evaluation. 
One practical suggestion to implement an RCT would be to select a subset of some 
of the topic awards with a random process.  Since each topic receives around 15 
applications, the suggestion would be to identify the five highest rated applications, 
randomly select the winner from those five applications, and track the relative performance 
of the firms that received the award and those who did not.  There is a possibility that this 
type of experiment could be double blind because the firms would never know if they 
received the award due to random assignment and the program managers actually 
managing the SBIR contract could be kept blind to the actual award decision.  The DoD 
SBIR program is an ideal candidate for incorporating some aspect of an RCT to evaluate the 
program.  There are hundreds of topics each year, thousands of applicants, the research 
budget is by its very nature discretionary (not on a programs-critical path, or vital for national 
security), and the firms can be tracked over time.   
In lieu of the opportunity to perform an RCT, researchers should continue to apply 
the propensity score and doubly robust estimation methods to SBIR administrative data.  
These after-the-fact estimation protocols could be improved if the actual evaluation scores 
were made available to researchers.  If the evaluation scores were made available, 
researchers could use the scores to better match firms with balancing algorithms. 
Researchers could use the proposal evaluation scores in regression models to explain more 
variation in the outcomes of interest. 
Current best practices in developmental economics have adopted RCT’s (Rodrik & 
Rosenzweig, 2009).  The focus of developmental economics—on improving the lives of the 
citizens of poor nations through interventions such as micro-financing, distributing anti-
mosquito nets, improving immunizations and improving potable water supplies—by its 
nature makes it a much humbler and moderately funded field than national R&D policy 





• Randomized controlled trials (RCTs), in which randomly-selected 
subpopulations are selected for an intervention and then outcomes are 
compared across the treated and untreated populations, have been used to 
evaluate the causal effects of specific programs (e.g., cash transfers, 
subsidies to medical inputs), delivery mechanisms (e.g., kinds of financial 
products), and, less pervasively, to obtain evidence on fundamental 
behavioral assumptions that underlie models used to justify policy – e.g., 
adverse selection.   
If policy administrators can adopt RCT methods to determine the best way to deliver 
developmental economics policy interventions, then the better-funded, higher-profile field of 
R&D policy analysis should be able to muster the resources and institutional will necessary 
to implement limited RCT studies to better understand the efficacy of the $1B+ DoD SBIR 
program.   
Policy makers should seriously consider incorporating randomization into the 
DoD SBIR program to improve the evaluation of the program and to demonstrate how 
to build evaluation tools into other government programs. 
Conclusion on How to Improve SBIR Program Evaluation 
These three suggestions could help revolutionize the way the SBIR program is 
evaluated and offer a wider variety of answers to the policy questions.   With more data 
available, better links to research output and actual experimental results, the artifacts of the 
DoD SBIR program that actually work best can be understood, refined and applied as best 
practices across the DoD and Federal government.  With better analyses, policy makers can 
use facts to craft and administer better policies. This paper has provided a small sample of 
the research possible if evaluation data and tools are improved.  If any form of these 
recommendations is adopted, the DoD SBIR program can be better evaluated.  
Suggestions for Further Evidence-based Acquisition Policy 
Analysis 
• The program evaluation tools demonstrated in this paper highlights that it is 
possible to evaluate the effectiveness of some aspects of the defense 
acquisition systems.  The after-the-fact tools demonstrated in this paper and 
the suggestion to implement randomized controlled trials can be applied to 
other areas of the defense acquisition system to provide policy makers 
evidence of how well policy changes perform.   Specifically there are  policy 
changes enacted by the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act (P.L.111) 
and the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009 (P.L. 110-417) that 
are worthy of consideration for evaluation with experimental and quasi-
experimental methods.   Some examples of the policy recommendations that 
might be suited for experimental anslysis are as follows: the emphasis on 
competition, the requirement for prototyping, the implementation of earned 
value management, and the increase in the number of acquisition 
professionals.   
• For example, estimating the effectiveness of maintaining competition 
throughout the acquisition lifecycle could be part of a randomized trial or 
could be analyzed using quasi-experimental methods.  For an RCT, policy 





implement competition in technology development, prototyping, and 
production.  Analysts could estimate the effect of competition by measuring 
the difference in cost changes and schedule delays on the programs with and 
without competition.  If randomization of competition requirements is 
infeasible, after-the-fact analyses could estimate the effect of competition on 
cost and schedule.  The evaluator could use the characteristics of the 
different programs (weapon type, joint program, service of program office, 
year of program initiation), along with an identifier on whether they had 
competition or not to build treatment and control groups and to explain other 
variations in program outcomes.   
Conclusion 
Congress is re-emphasizing its direction to the DoD to improve the evaluation 
methodologies for the defense acquisition system.  This paper highlights that for some 
aspects of the defense acquisition system quasi-experimental methods can be applied and 
do provide evidence to estimate program efficacy.  This paper recommends that DoD policy 
makers build more experimental and quasi-experimental links into the current DoD SBIR 
program to improve the evidence available to acquisition policy makers.  Based on this 
demonstration, policy makers should consider broadening the application of these methods 
beyond the SBIR program to acquisition system aspects that can be analyzed with 
experimental and quasi-experimental models.  
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